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of the catalytic events since 1989/90 that triggered a process 
of rethinking among anti-Germans. 
At the time of German reunification in 1990, anti-Germans still 
took to the streets against a feared strengthening of national-
ism and imperialist megalomania with the slogan «Germany, 
shut your mouth». Only a year later, when the Gulf war began 
and the peace movement in Germany interpreted this war 
in anti-imperialist terms, accordingly using the slogan «no 
blood for oil», the writer Hans-Magnus Enzensberger caused 
a stir when he termed Saddam Hussein the «reincarnation of 
Hitler» and sharply criticised the peace movement for its paci-
fism. Enzensberger was supposedly taking an anti-fascist po-
sition and sought to justify the war in this way. Wolf Biermann 
also became a bellicist, legitimising the war as the protec-
tion of Israel, and holding Germany in particular responsible, 
because German firms had supplied poisonous gas to Iraq, 
their scud missiles plunging Israelis into fear. At that point, 
the bellicism of both of these intellectuals was still quite an 
exception, yet it successfully introduced a bellicist-antifas-
cist rhetoric of legitimation endorsed by the likes of Joschka 
Fischer and the anti-Germans. Nonetheless, in these years 
the anti-Germans still distributed flyers that read: «Bomber 
Harris, do it again», and Fischer fulminated that the German 
state in alliance with NATO was being led into an imperialist 
war by misplaced humanitarian arguments.
During the escalations of the then disintegrating Yugoslavia, 
the attitude towards war underwent a change in the case of 
Fischer and the anti-Germans. Subsequently, the focus be-
came the prevention of a second Auschwitz with the massa-
cre of Srebrenica in the mid-1990s. Fischer distanced himself 
and the Green Party from pacifism and anti-imperialism, in-
stead demanding compulsory military intervention in cases of 
In Germany as a whole and even on the Left, there is prob-
ably no other international conflict that has been publicly 
discussed in such controversial and emotionally charged 
ways than the Israel-Palestine, or more broadly, the Middle 
East conflict. For this reason, this theme has acquired a spe-
cial place in the educational work of the Rosa-Luxemburg-
Foundation within the country as well as abroad. Given how 
opinions diverge within the Foundation and amongst its as-
sociates, we do not consider it our task to present a closed 
and uniform position, but rather to provide a forum for de-
bate that meets the demands of an emancipatory political 
education. Moreover, in order to satisfy the requirements of 
analytical rigour, the RLS is currently involved in a process of 
systematising its engagement with the topic of the Middle 
East conflict. A members’ workshop in July 2010 formed 
the prelude to that. The workshop resulted in six papers that 
will appear in a loose sequence as viewpoints of the RLS. 
More detailed information on the thematic engagement of 
the RLS with the Middle East conflict can also be found here: 
http://www.rosalux.de/themen/internationale-politik/thema/
naher-osten
Since the middle of the 1990s, there has been a fundamental 
dispute among individual currents of the Left in Germany 
with regard to the current relevance and explanatory valence 
of the theory of imperialism. At times more intensively and 
at times less so, the fight is taken out into the open by tradi-
tional anti-imperialists and the so called anti-Germans. This 
unresolved dispute has an impact on every political or aca-
demic analysis of international relations on the German Left. 
Particularly with respect to the Middle East conflict, senti-
ments are extremely divided. Therefore, it seems imperative 
to look into the question of the virulence of imperialism. This 
article attempts to do so in a consideration of the necessity of 
external-political sovereignty of nation states and the related 
question of the mechanisms of war and peace.1
ImperIal InterpretatIon versus  
the culturalIsatIon of the polItIcal
Understanding how the dispute between anti-imperialists 
and anti-Germans came about requires a brief reconstruction 
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1 The Middle East Conflict is only ever marginally addressed. The extent to which the 
Middle East Conflict is still relevant today for theorising imperialism is something the 
author is sceptical about. 2 It must be noted that Fischer was responding to a blind spot 
on the anti-imperialist left whose categorical pacifism has often seemed indifferent to 
genocide, overemphasising the imperialist rationales of military interventions. Likewise, 
the anti-Germans can also be criticised for being one-sided in disregarding imperialist 
motives. Moreover, Auschwitz plays an important role in legitimising pacifism. However, 
what is often overlooked is that the liberation of Auschwitz would not have been possible 
without the military intervention of the Anti-Hitler Coalition, even if it can be said that this 
coalition had imperialist motives.
2genocide.2 This retraction took until 1998 to effectively propel 
the Green Party to government. Fischer used Enzensberger’s 
anti-fascist rhetoric of legitimation, which consequently also 
became the dominant model of interpretation for the anti-
Germans. 
The onset of visions of One World, as the new world order 
was initially referred to following the dissolution of bipolarity 
and the furore over Francis Fukuyama’s «The End of History 
and the Last Man» in 19923, was embarrassing given the re-
ality that was unfolding. Nonetheless, from 1994 onwards 
this new paradigm became more established, propagated 
by Samuel P. Huntington as the «Clash of Civilizations». This 
paradigm promoted a culturalisation of the political.4 It was 
diametrically opposed to the traditional models of imperi-
alism. On an ideological level, the anti-German milieu was 
taken in by it.5 When the terrorist attacks occurred in the USA 
on September 11 2001, this milieu interpreted them in terms 
of cultural difference, a «declaration of war against western 
civilisation» and an attack by «Islamic fascism».6 As a result, 
anti-Germans declared their unconditional solidarity with the 
USA and equated anti-Americanism with anti-Semitism.
The Middle East, i. e. Israel, received a special boost within 
the interpretations of events promoted by anti-Germans: the 
entire world – and the Arab world in particular – was consid-
ered to be anti-Semitic. The USA was the sole power that 
could reliably protect Israel. Given this understanding, it be-
came paramount for the anti-Germans to pledge their uncon-
ditional solidarity with the USA and Israel, irrespective of any 
of the decisions the two states took. Since then, there has 
been an intense confrontation between anti-Germans and 
anti-imperialists regarding the extent to which the Middle 
East conflict plays a role in the analysis of international rela-
tions. The theory of imperialism lies at the core of the dispute. 
Traditional bourgeois and socialist theories of imperialism7 
assume that the foreign policy of a sovereign nation-state 
necessarily aims at acquiring, expanding and strengthening 
an individual state’s power. On a strategic level, the state 
must consider its economic and security interests in the in-
ternational context. Accordingly, policy is directed at the max-
imisation of profit and the efficiency of national economies. 
Resulting disadvantages for other states are not only factored 
in to strategic calculations, they are intentional. Solidarity 
among nation-states would therefore seem difficult to real-
ise in a capitalist system. Individual nation-states necessarily 
compete with one another and in the context of an interna-
tional power play, they are compelled to assert themselves 
to this end. Therefore, imperialism emerges as an inevitable 
consequence. The particular imperialist forms of power de-
ployed in foreign policy result from the economic and military 
power of the individual states, from their financial and cul-
tural resources, as well as from their international reputation. 
Conflicts are inevitable, and are generally resolved through 
diplomatic or military means. The competitiveness that is in-
herent in the state system necessitates state sovereignty or 
some form of supranational sovereignty that challenges and 
constrains the absolute sovereignty of existing states. Conse-
quently, the purpose of a state’s military is not only to protect 
its national borders and citizens, but also and primarily to 
ensure the income and profits of national and transnational 
corporations. Thus, the status a nation has is determined by 
the strike capacity of its military. The sovereignty of a capi-
talist state is premised upon the relationship between the 
economy, politics and the military, internally and externally.
germany In the bIpolar world order
In cases where a state’s sovereignty has been abrogated, 
as was the case with Germany after 1945 (and where the 
process of regaining of sovereignty was slow), the systemic 
context outlined above becomes particularly apparent: «It 
became clear that today politics is only as powerful as the 
[military] power behind it (…). Without power anything we 
say is ignored.»8
There were restrictions on Germany’s sovereignty until 
1989/90. Prior to German reunification, Germany had no in-
dependence to determine its own foreign policy and had to 
subordinate itself to the world powers within the international 
system of alliances. For this reason, many conservatives con-
sidered the West German state to be an «economic giant» on 
the one hand and a «political dwarf» on the other. «The old 
Federal Republic had two important characteristics. The first 
was that it could not shape its foreign policy independently, 
the second was its subordinate role as a military power. Both 
were expressions of Germany’s incomplete sovereignty and 
its associated dependencies – dependency on the United 
States in world politics, and on France with respect to Eu-
rope.»9 From this situation one can infer the state’s continu-
ous strive to normalise its foreign policy, understood as the 
achievement of superpower status and political parity10 with 
other world powers. This condition can also be termed the 
German normalisation complex. «Given that political equality 
was only possible with German reunification, i. e. not through 
its own strength, to a great extent (…) German politics shifted 
to the military sphere. However, the mere strategic location 
at the nexus between the two blocks of the Cold War does 
3 Fukuyama tried to explain the end of imperialism by arguing that it could be empirically 
proven that «liberal democracies do not behave imperialistically towards one another, even 
if they are perfectly capable of going to war with states that are not democracies and do 
not share fundamental values.» – Francis Fukuyama: The End of History and the Last Man, 
New York: The Free Press, 1992, p. 24. Yet Fukuyama is blind to the fact that not all impe-
rialist policies result in war and that even for contemporary imperialism war is a last resort 
because war is not considered a necessary means to achieve imperialist goals. Moreover, 
Fukuyama overlooks that even after the dissolution of the bipolar world order, the world 
dös not only consist of liberal democracies. 4 «Economic and political struggles over 
distribution are presented as cultural struggles and their cause explained by the principled 
incompatibility of different cultures. Instead of negotiation, cooperation and communica-
tion, the insistence on cultural identities assumes fundamental traditionalist differences 
that cannot be negotiated. Conflicts that invoke cultural difference have their own 
dynamic.» – Tatjana Freytag: Der unternommene Mensch. Eindimensionalisierungsporo-
zesse in der gegenwärtigen Gesellschaft, Weilerswist: Velbrück GmbH Bücher & Medien, 
2000, p. 134. 5 This thesis was presented at the RLS Members Workshop, «The Left and 
the Middle East Conflict – Stories and Sensibilities» (July 10 2010). There was not only 
agreement. Micha Brumlik questioned the extent of coherence amongst proponents of 
an anti-German interpretation. The author wishes to clarify that there are identifiable 
qualitative differences between the anti-German milieu, leading proponents and their 
followers. 6 The terrorist attacks on September 11 2001 painted a different kind of picture 
regarding patterns of anti-imperialism. The World Trade Centre into which two planes were 
flown symbolised the economic power of the USA. The Pentagon was also targeted as a 
symbol of military power. A further plan targeted the White House, the symbol of political 
power. Why was the statue of liberty, a cultural symbol of the freedom of the West, not 
targeted by the terrorists? That would have been a more apt target for an attack on western 
civilisation. 7 The many different theoretical approaches to imperialism make it difficult 
to provide a general definition of the concept. Nonetheless, an attempt to do so can be 
undertaken using Jürgen Osterhammel’s work: «Imperialism encompasses those forces 
and activities that contribute to building and maintaining (…) trans-colonial empires. Impe-
rialism also includes the will and the capacity to uphold an imperial centre, defining one’s 
own national interests as imperial and promoting them within the anarchical international 
system. Imperialism dös not simply imply a colonial politics, but a world politics in which 
colonies are not simply ends in themselves but pawns in a global power game.» – Juergen 
Osterhammel: Kolonialismus. Geschichten, Formen, Folgen, 2nd edition, Munich: C. H. 
Beck, 1997; p. 27f. 8 Konrad Adenauer cited in David Meienreis and Frank Renken (eds.): 
Krieg und Globalisierung. Der Imperialismus: Vom Kolonialismus zu den Kriegen des 21. 
Jahrhunderts, Frankfurt am Main: Edition Aurora, 2002, p. 52. 9 Andrei S. Markovits and 
Simon Reich: Das deutsche Dilemma. Die Berliner Republik zwi schen Macht und 
Machtverzicht, foreword by Joschka Fischer, Berlin: Alexander Fest Verlag, 1998, 
p. 51. 10 Cf. Gregor Schöllgen: Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Von 
den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart, Bonn: C. H. Beck, 1999, p. 227.
3not fully explain the overwhelming focus of German foreign 
policy on the areas of security, defence and alliances. Germa-
ny also sought to avoid second class status in the region.»11 
From Adenauer to Kohl German security policy concentrated 
on the less overt question of how to circumvent its second-
class status resulting from the restrictions to its sovereignty.
Moreover, due to the fact that it was not allowed to possess 
nuclear weapons, the West German state was forced to play 
a minor role within the circle of allied countries, which for 
Franz Josef Strauss was not compatible with his sense of 
«national honour». During the Cold War, the capacity to de-
ploy the nuclear bomb was the «decisive feature of sover-
eignty».12 Hence when Strauss was Minister of Defence, he 
sought to develop West Germany’s capacities with regard 
to the ownership and deployment of nuclear weapons; this 
was not merely a question of rearmament, but of equal sta-
tus amongst other western powers, especially in relation to 
Great Britain and France.13 Since the mid-1960s, this so-called 
«German Gaullism»14 marked the beginning of attempts to 
diminish dependence on the allied forces. From the begin-
ning of the 1960s onwards under Charles de Gaulles, France 
rose to become an independent nuclear power and assumed 
a special status within NATO and vis-a-vis the USA. Strauss 
and Adenauer hoped for an alliance with France in order to 
become a nuclear power, or at least to be included in France’s 
nuclear power status. Initially, the French government even 
showed an interest, but on account of international pressure 
as well as pressure from the anti-nuclear-movement,15 these 
plans had to be discarded. As a result, the French government 
rescinded on «German Gaullism».
«German Gaullism» was only a first attempt at determining 
the extent to which the shackles restricting German sover-
eignty could be broken.16 Subsequently, the SPD-FDP («Red-
Yellow») Government took a different course. In 1969, a Nu-
clear Non-Proliferation Treaty was signed. CSU leader Strauss 
was strongly opposed to signing the Treaty and termed it a 
«Versailles of cosmic proportions». Federal Chancellor Willy 
Brandt sought to assuage opposition to the Treaty with as-
surances of its short-term applicability: «If one day a United 
States of Europe were to be created, then these states would 
not be bound by the Non-Proliferation Treaty and could be-
come nuclear powers.»17
In the context of a power equilibrium within comparable cate-
gories of weapons – primarily with respect to nuclear destruc-
tive potential between East and West – the nuclear bomb 
had more of the character of a political rather than a military 
weapon. The nuclear bomb served as a form of deterrence; its 
existence was supposed to ensure that it would not have to 
be put to military use.18 This doctrine of deterrence signalled 
progress in terms of civilisation compared to the more or 
less restricted Ius ad Bellum. According to Gerhard Stuby, 
although equal parity does not rule out that nuclear powers 
will continue to seek military superiority, within the logic of 
deterrence, it creates a sense of credibility as opposed to 
projections of cold-blooded readiness to use nuclear weap-
ons. «However, the moment one reduces military potential 
to deterrence, one accepts – at least verbally – the principle 
of non-aggression, thus conceding that military capacity 
must remain restricted to defence. In the context here, this 
means retaliation following a prior attack. A military strategy 
of Blitzkrieg, i. e. of a surprise first attack, can therefore not 
be propagated openly.»19 Yet the phase of nuclear deterrence 
did not necessarily imply any sustained form of progress with 
respect to civilisation. This is because the dissolution of the 
bipolar world order and the end of military parity meant that 
Ius ad Bellum was once again prioritised over deterrence. 
Furthermore, the use of nuclear weapons in the form of mini-
nukes no longer meant that a nuclear contamination of the 
whole world would result from the deployment of nuclear 
force. After 1989/90 and the fall of the Soviet Union, nuclear 
deterrence lost its impact with the USA remaining the only 
superpower that asserted its Ius ad Bellum with NATO and the 
UN virtually as an exclusive right; the USA does not have to 
fear any serious counter-attacks because there is no military 
power that can match it. As long as they are in possession of 
nuclear bombs, states that feel threatened by the imperial-
ist strategy of the USA – and increasingly also the EU – still 
use deterrence as a form of defence (for example, commu-
nist North Korea). This enables them to negotiate diplomatic 
relations with the USA, EU etc., instead of being «simply» 
attacked like Iraq. In these terms, it is rational for Iran to en-
deavour to develop nuclear capacities.
During the Cold War, German foreign policy was synonymous 
with «utilising the existing basic conditions within available 
means»20 and pursuing a policy of small steps to modify these 
basic conditions. According to Gregor Schoellgen, Germany 
has shown a «remarkable balance» in this regard. In complete 
contrast to the foreign policy of the German Reich, whose 
principle was to disregard such basic conditions and realise 
the «impossible»,21 German foreign policy since 1945 has dis-
played moderation in its sense of reality and has followed the 
principle of «making the necessary possible».22 In the context 
of foreign policy, what does necessary mean to a nation state 
within global capitalism?
competItIon among states after  
the dIssolutIon of bIpolarIty
During the Cold War, competition among capitalist states was 
superimposed by a bipolar system. Despite the dissolution of 
the bipolar world order, capitalist competition among states 
has again appeared unbridled. However, states are also in-
creasingly compelled to cooperate with one another because 
11 Ibid., p. 226. 12 Cf. Franz Josef Strauss: Die Erinnerungen, Berlin: btb Verlag, 1989, 
p. 310. 13 Cf. Gerhard Stuby: Die «gefesselte» Souveränität der Bundesrepublik. Zur 
Entwicklung der BRD im Rahmen der US Globalstrategie, Heilbronn: Distel Literatur Ver-
lag, 1987, p. 130. 14 Charles de Gaulle sought to establish France’s maximum independ-
ence from the western allied forces within the bipolar world order. This is the reason why 
he placed so much emphasis on the national ownership and power to deploy nuclear 
bombs. Prominent defendants of «German Gaullism» were Franz Josef Strauss (CSU), 
Konrad Adenauer (CDU), as well as the publisher Axel Springer. – «They merely pre-empted 
what since then has been occurring step by step, namely the reestablishment of Germany 
as an independent imperial power.» – Meienreis and Renken (eds.): Krieg und Globalis-
ierung. Der Imperialismus: Vom Kolonialismus zu den Kriegen des 21. Jahrhunderts, 
Frankfurt am Main: Edition Aurora, 2002, p. 56. 15 Cf. Hans-Karl Rupp: Ausserparlamen-
tarische Opposition in der Ära Adenauer. Der Kampf gegen die Atombewaffnung in der 
50er Jahren, Cologne: Paul Rugenstein, 1980. 16 Cf. Stuby: Die «gefesselte» Souveränität 
der Bundesrepublik. Zur Entwicklung der BRD im Rahmen der US Globalstrategie, Heil-
bronn: Distel Literatur Verlag, 1987, p. 216. 17 Franz Josef Strauss and Willy Brandt cited 
in Volkhard Mosler: An Krieg wieder gewöhnen? Niemals! Die Rückkehr des deutschen 
Militarismus, Frankfurt am Main: Edition Aurora, 1999, p. 32. 18 Cf. J. Strelzow: «Warum 
das annähernde militärische Gleichgewicht gwahrt werden muss», in horizont, 27/1982, 
p. 10; on military parity, see also Adelbert Weinstein: «Verwirrung in der Allianz. Die NATO 
und der Atom», in: FAZ April 20 1982, p. 12. 19 Stuby: Die «gefesselte» Souveränität der 
Bundesrepublik. Zur Entwicklung der BRD im Rahmen der US Globalstrategie, Heilbronn: 
Distel Literatur Verlag, 1987, p.124. 20 Cf. Gregor Schöllgen: Die Aussenpolitik der Bun-
desrepublik Deutschland. Von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart, Bonn: C. H. Beck, 1999, 
p. 230. 21 Cf. Kurt Riezler: Die Erforderlichkeit des Unmöglichen. Prolegomena zu einer 
Theorie der Politik und zu anderen Theorien, Munich: G. Müller Verlag, 1913. 22 Cf. Gre-
gor Schöllgen: Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Von den Anfängen bis 
zur Gegenwart, Bonn: Distel Literatur Verlag, 1999, p. 230.
4of increasing interdependencies within world politics and as a 
result of global economic interrelations («globalisation»). This 
means that the traditional concept of nation-state sovereignty 
is less relevant and the principles of national foreign policy 
have changed. However, foreign policy was never a purely 
national issue because it always had to react to actions and 
ambitions of other allied or competing states, either in im-
mediate proximity or in distant regions. However, since the 
1990s, the relevance of the traditional theory of imperialism 
remains unresolved. 
After the dissolution of the bipolar world order at the begin-
ning of the 1990s, euphoric visions of «global governance» 
become fashionable. «Governance (…) [means] the totality of 
numerous paths through which individuals as well as public 
and private institutions regulate their common affairs.» It is 
a continuous process for balancing conflicting and varied 
interests and initiating cooperative action. Governance en-
compasses formal institutions and systems of rule with pow-
ers of implementation, as well as informal regulations agreed 
upon or considered by people and institutions to be in their 
own interest.23 According to Ines Katenhausen and Wolfram 
Lamping, governance has gradually become a «linguisti-
cally attractive ground upon which to project vague «desired 
conditions» of new forms of statehood and the fulfilment of 
tasks through cooperation and participatory processes. Gov-
ernance defines itself as different from ‹old› or ‹traditional› 
governance.»24
Henceforth mankind was supposed to grow together to form 
a global society and proponents proclaimed a new era of 
peace and development in one world of capitalism that left 
no space for any alternative. This view was related to the 
much discussed thesis of the «end of history», understood as 
capitalism and bringing about the best of all possible worlds. 
Very quickly this proved to be an illusion. However, beyond 
the Left, nobody posed the question of whether «impulses 
for imperialist politics are inherent in capitalism;»25 moreover, 
in some sections of the Left, imperialism was considered 
an out-dated phenomenon and shelved. What does belong 
to the past, is the imperialism of the 19th century and the 
ways in which it proliferated two world wars during the first 
half of the 20th century. Nevertheless, imperial and hegem-
onic thinking has not disappeared, even if European states 
compete less and less with one another today; competition 
occurs more among the European Union, the USA, China 
and Russia.
the old ImperIalIsm
The term imperialism (Latin imperium = dominance, area 
of dominance) emerged in the middle of the 19th century 
and referred to the system of governance under Napoleon III 
(1853–1870). Some years later, the term also emerged in 
Great Britain. British liberals used it as «battle cry» against 
the conservative Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli, who at 
the beginning of the 1870s had declared «the retention and 
extension of the Empire through confederation and expan-
sion an urgent goal of British foreign policy».26 Only at the 
very end of the 19th century did the term acquire the meaning 
that is attributed to it today. The context for this is provided 
by the expansion of European nation-states that from 1881 
were embroiled in a «race» to acquire «colonies» (i. e. the not 
yet occupied regions).
The high phase of imperialism lasted from 1881 to the end of 
the First World War. The preceding phase initiated by the Vi-
enna Congress is referred to as the epoch of early imperialism 
(1815–1880). In 1881, the French military occupied Tunisia 
and in 1882 the British military occupied Egypt. This triggered 
the rush for a slice of colonisation. Once most of the overseas 
regions had been divided up among the European powers, 
they went to war with one another. The German state, which 
had started «too late» in the colonialism race, was consid-
ered to be particularly aggressive in demanding its «place 
under the sun». At the end of the First World War, Thomas 
Woodrow Wilson sought to eliminate the conditions for impe-
rialist domination and demanded that the legitimate interests 
of colonised countries be considered in a reorganisation of 
international politics. Lenin’s «decree on peace» dated 8th 
November 1917 also has its place in this context. The decree 
demanded the elimination of colonial domination and the 
right to self-determination for colonised peoples. In 1920, the 
League of Nations was founded as an international institution 
to balance national interests. The process of decolonisation 
process began, although it only really made headway after 
1945.
Yet efforts to overcome the existing imperialist order were 
not deep-reaching enough. Imperialism cannot simply be 
overcome by means of political reorganisation and decoloni-
sation. Immanent attempts that include forms of state regula-
tion, i. e. interventions into the economy like Keynesianism, 
are also insufficient. The latter highlights how a decrease in 
internal demand within a national economy (consumption) 
leads to a rise in the capitalist compulsion for sales abroad 
(export of goods and capital). Intensified competition emerg-
es when all countries face this situation. This can only be 
absorbed in a limited way through comprehensive Keynesian 
policy-making. However, this does not prevent imperialism.27 
Those who refuse to criticise capitalism should keep silent 
about imperialism. 
Today, as a concept, imperialism appears to have limited use 
as an affective weapon in political science. This is because 
it has come to encompass a number of different meanings, 
meaning its analytical distinctiveness is lost. Moreover, the 
distinction between «formal» and «informal» imperialism has 
contributed to the loss of analytical distinctiveness. «Whilst 
formal imperialism refers to the direct political and military 
control of a territory, its informal variant pertains to the so-
called ‹penetration pacifique›, i. e. the peaceful penetration of 
a region. Whilst the objective here is also control, it is control 
in an indirect manner, usually through economic means. In-
23 Commission on Global Governance: Our Global Neighbourhood. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1995, p. 4 – «In particular governance distinguishes itself from government. 
Whilst the latter describes the institutionalised state-led system of coordination, govern-
ance is the regulatory system that coordinates collective action.» – Dietrich Fürst: «Regional 
Governance zwischen Wohlfahrtsstaat und neo-liberaler Marktwirtschaft», in Ines Katen-
hausen and Wolfram Lamping (eds.): Demokratien in Europa. Der Einfluss der europäischen 
Integration auf Institutionenwandel und neue Konturen des demokratischen Verfas-
sungsstaates, Opladen: VS Verlag, 2003, p. 9–28; p. 24. 24 Ines Katenhausen and Wolfram 
Lamping: «Über diesen Band: Demokratie, europäische Integration und Institutionenwan-
del.» in Ines Katenhausen and Wolfram Lamping (eds.): Demokratien in Europa. Der Ein-
fluss der europäischen Integration auf Institutionenwandel und neue Konturen des demok-
ratischen Verfassungsstaates, Opladen: VS Verlag, 2003, pp. 251–267; p. 251. 25 Arno 
Klönne: «Empire und Empirie. Zum Diskurs über US-amerikanische Globalpolitik», in Rainer 
Butenschön und Eckart Spoo (eds.): Töten – Plündern – Herrschen. Wege zu neuen Kriegen, 
Hamburg: VSA Verlag, 2003, p. 126–130; p. 127. 26 Cf. Peter Alter: Der Imperialismus. 
Grundlagen – Probleme – Theorien, Stuttgart: Klett Verlag, 2001, p. 2. Speech of Prime 
Minister Benjamin Disräli to representatives of the constituency organisations of the Con-
servative Part at Crystal Palace in London on June 24 1872, op. cit., p. 12. 27 Cf. John A. 
Hobson: Der Imperialismus (1902), Cologne/Bonn: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1970.
5formal imperialism can assume different forms, including (…) 
Free Trade Agreements and friendship or protection agree-
ments. The most frequent and simultaneously most effec-
tive method of indirect control has certainly been to make 
countries overseas economically and financially dependent on 
European states to such an extent that indirect forms of con-
trol can no longer really be distinguished from direct political 
control.»28 The concept of «informal imperialism», Peter Alter 
writes, «should serve the purpose of covering this period’s 
numerous intermediate forms of political, economic or even 
cultural dependence of underdeveloped regions vis-a-vis the 
industrially advanced imperialist powers.» In reality, the ways 
in which concept has undergone differentiation have actu-
ally led to generalisations. Its contours have been blurred to 
the extent that «all relations between differently developed 
countries become imperialist. Consequently, for example, 
economic exchange relationships between states with dif-
fering economic power cannot be viewed as distinct from im-
perialism.»29 For this reason, Alter advises a restrained use of 
the concept of imperialism. However, the continued relevance 
of imperialism goes against this advice. Just as it was possible 
to designate «colonialism» as the highest phase of imperialism 
(1881–1917),30 it should be possible to determine a concise 
expression for the continuation of imperialism after 1990. 
the new ImperIalIsm: hegemonIalIsm
The new phase of imperialism no longer means bringing for-
eign regions under direct control through the acquisition of 
particular territories, it means putting other governments un-
der pressure and restricting their sovereignty in order to retain 
mediated or even direct access, and includes the exercise of 
power in foreign markets.31 This phase of imperialism can be 
termed hegemonialism.
In any case, it is a widely spread illusion to assume that impe-
rialism belongs to the past. Proponents of the obsolescence 
of imperialism argue that with so-called globalisation modern 
nation-states are no longer concerned with expanding their 
territories through antagonistic land acquisitions (i. e. war). 
According to classical theories of imperialism, this is because 
«land greed» is a characteristic of feudal social relations that 
are no longer relevant in modern societies. However, just be-
cause feudalism has been disbanded in advanced industrial 
countries, this does not mean modern wars no longer have 
imperialist rationales. 
Today, it is sufficient to control foreign capital in order to real-
ise the interests of national capital, meaning that hostile land 
acquisitions are not necessary. Nonetheless, war continues 
to serve as a means of last resort to enforce national inter-
ests against foreign countries, in other words the «greed for 
markets», or as Marx calls it, the «craving for more work». 
Wars are usually an expression of economic interests. Fur-
thermore, military superiority over other nation-states serves 
the purpose of enforcing economic interests. This still hap-
pens even though the interests of capital are becoming less 
and less nationally oriented. Since the mid-1980s, the state’s 
«greed for markets» in foreign countries has quantitatively 
increased, obtaining a new quality captured under the term 
«globalisation». Globalisation has meant the establishment of 
massive production centres abroad, exporting capital rather 
than goods. Since 1985, there has been a gradual increase of 
the production of goods abroad, and this now dominates over 
the export of goods. In 1992, with 5.2 billion dollars, the sales 
figure of foreign subsidiary companies surpassed the 4.9 bil-
lion dollars of world trade. In 2000, the income of subsidiary 
companies abroad already doubled that of world export vol-
ume and the volume of «foreign direct investments» (export 
of capital) reached 20 percent of the gross world product; in 
1980, this figure had still been at five per cent.32 To describe 
these trends, the term «transnational capital» was introduced. 
The focus on capital export constitutes the key qualitative 
change captured by the term «globalisation». The state’s in-
terest in shaping foreign markets has thus increased; this 
is because capital export relies much more on democratic 
and capital-friendly infrastructures abroad than the export 
of goods does. This is not so relevant for the western and 
transatlantic neighbour states where democratic and capital-
ist structures are firmly anchored; it is mainly relevant for the 
lesser developed, pre-modern or half-modern countries of the 
world that are being increasingly capitalised upon.
The term «globalisation» is a very vague description of the 
qualitative changes triggered by the transformation proc-
esses of the beginning of the 1990s. The reason for this is 
that globalisation is not an historical novelty that began with 
the collapse of the bipolar world order, if it means the ten-
dency of capital to spread over the entire globe on account 
of the «craving for added value», causing the evaporation 
of all that is standing, adapting any backward social condi-
tions it finds to the modern standards necessary for capital. 
Already 150 years ago, Marx and Engels brought the political 
economy of capital’s compulsion into focus and there has 
been no change to this fact.33 Thus, the term «globalisation» 
fakes the simultaneity of conditions in which the simultaneity 
of non-simultaneity forms the driving impulse for modernisa-
tion dynamics in less developed societies.34
The qualitative change in political economy has more to 
do with the fact that the 1990s saw the universal history of 
the law of value freed from some biting inhibitions. For the 
first time ever, the perpetually precarious unity of national 
economy and nation-state was eroded, leaving behind an in-
creasingly disempowered state vis-a-vis transnational capital. 
Capital no longer has a home country, although it is not com-
pletely detached from it: capital knows many home countries 
and one is as good as the other, as long as the conditions for 
optimum capital accumulation are provided by such «loca-
tions». The capitalist state feels obligated by this process, 
whilst at the same time it has to ensure that the conditions of 
«its» national capital find good business conditions abroad. 
Obviously, capital plays one home country off against another 
in order to accelerate the modernisation process in individual 
states.
28 Cf. Gregor Schöllgen: Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Von den 
Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart, Bonn: C. H. Beck, 1999, p. 39. 29 Cf. Peter Alter: Der Impe-
rialismus. Grundlagen – Probleme – Theorien, Stuttgart: Klett Verlag, 2001, p. 3. 30 «The 
terms imperialism’ and colonialism thus do not denote same thing. To some extent impe-
rialism is broader, meaning that colonialism seems to be more of a particular case.» – 
Osterhammel: Kolonialismus, Geschichten, Formen. Op. cit. 31 «H[egemony] (gr.) 
denotes the (military, economic, cultural etc.) superiority or dominance of one state over 
one or more other states.» –Klaus Schubert, Martina Klein: Das Politlexikon, 4th edition, 
Bonn: Dietz Verlag, 2006. 32 Cf. Le Monde Diplomatique (ed.): Atlas der Globalisierung, 
p. 30, p. 26f. 33 Cf. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels: «Manifest der Kommunistischen 
Partei», in: MEW, Bd. 4, Berlin 1959. 34 For a further critique of globalisation see (with 
some reservations) Christiane Grefe, Matthias Greffrath and Harald Schuhmann: attac. 
Was wollen die Globalisierungskritiker? Berlin: Rowohlt, 2002; for a more comprehensive 
and foundational critique, see «Globalisierungskritik» in Michel Chossudovsky: Global 
Brutal. Der entfesselte Welthandel, die Armut, der Krieg, Frankfurt and Main: Zweitausen-
deins, 2002.
6According to classical Marxist analysis, the state is the execu-
tive that organises the interests of capital. Yet, rather than 
the particular interests of individual capitalists, the state or-
ganises the general interest of collective capital, meaning 
that the politics of the state can often come in conflict with 
individual capital fractions. The inevitable competition among 
necessarily myopic individuals endangers the welfare of the 
«ideal collective capitalist» that has to ensure that the long-
term goals that are in the interest of capital accumulation 
are pursued. In other words, it has to mediate between the 
different particular interests and take decisions that could 
often generate resistance from individuals. On the whole, 
the general interest of capital is safeguarded through the far-
sightedness of the state, yet as a rule, individual capitalists 
will fight the power of the state and fight for more freedom 
of movement. Accordingly, corporations are dependent on 
strong nation-states whose diplomacy and military strength 
remain the background for expansion.
The Chicago School that formed around Milton Friedman and 
coined the term neoliberalism, has provided the correspond-
ing ideology of free trade since the 1970s – first as a model in 
Latin America, then also in the USA and in West Europe, and 
after 1989 in the former countries of «really existing social-
ism». The theory of free trade was a challenge to market-pro-
tectionism with which states had tried to make their national 
economies more resistant to the world market. There had to 
be a stop put to this mental block against western capital.
After the end of the Cold War, the USA began to consolidate 
its superpower status as part of its globalisation strategy. The 
restructuring of the international and supranational institu-
tions of «global governance» for the enforcement of a neo-
liberal world economic order were directly related to the end 
of system confrontation. 
«The United States is in the process of methodically altering 
the architecture of international politics in such a way that its 
economic and military hegemony will no longer be subject 
to any kinds of restrictions, corrective powers or veto. This 
includes the ability to rise above another nation-state’s right 
to sovereignty, as well the authority to label certain states or 
organisations as terrorist and belligerently «silence» them if 
required also as a preventive measure. As a result, the func-
tion of both the Unites Nations and NATO has changed. Tra-
ditional requirements of international law become obsolete 
in the wake of a new architecture of world order.»35
With the role of supranational institutions like the IMF, the 
World Bank and the World Trade Organisation (WTO), neo-
liberal concepts are given a strong penetrative power, com-
bining credit grants with a «freeing» of the «third world» 
from debts to rich western industrial nations in exchange 
for structural adjustment, which essentially means giving up 
protectionism (opening of national markets to foreign capital, 
relaxing trade barriers, tying the national currency to the Dol-
lar and Euro, the reduction of inflation rates by saving on state 
expenditure primarily in the social sector, the dismantling of 
labour rights, the weakening of trade unions etc.). Depend-
ent countries end up under the direct influence of the «first 
world», meaning that they are restricted in their sovereignty 
with regard to domestic and foreign policy.
Through «supervision» and «consultations», the IMF controls 
currency and financial policy in almost all countries of the 
world and regulates the provision of international wealth. The 
G8-states alone have over 50 per cent of the voting rights 
within the IMF. This means that they dominate in ways that 
the remaining states of the world can hardly stand up. The 
World Bank gives around 30 billion US-dollars a year in aid 
to developing countries in the form of credit.36 The IMF and 
the World Bank draw up policies for currencies, finance and 
structure. The neoliberal criteria for allocating credit loans 
mean that they actively intervene in the domestic and foreign 
policy of other countries. Since 1994, the WTO has succeeded 
the organisation of GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade); its job entails the regulation of international trade with 
the objective of its total liberalisation (relaxation of trade bar-
riers and other obstacles to trade); it has 142 member states.
Meanwhile, international regulation and the «balance of in-
terests» function largely without any exercise of direct force; 
the hegemony of the law is generally recognised. «Although 
no open use of force is necessary, the ruthless implementa-
tion of economic reforms nevertheless represents a form of 
warfare. Generally, war and globalisation are not separate 
problems. (…) At the beginning of the third millennium, wars 
and ‹free› markets go hand in hand. War is to a certain extent 
the multilateral investment agreement of the latter instance. 
It physically destroys whatever has not yet been destroyed 
by deregulation, privatisation and enforcement of ‹market 
reforms›. (…) Today’s ‹rocket diplomacy› repeats the cannon 
boat diplomacy which in the 19th century served the purpose 
of enforcing ‹free trade›.»37
States that defy international regulation and do not recog-
nise «western norms» are exposed to the risk of becoming 
targets for military aggressions (for example Iran). The west-
ern values of pluralism, individualism and private property 
should be universally recognised and should have validity 
worldwide as norms of social coexistence. If this normative 
basis is questioned or cannot be ensured, heavy-handed ex-
ercises of power enter into politics or are even triggered by it. 
«The power of the USA has (…) presently no equally weighted 
competitors worldwide, but there are states that do not have 
the intention of recognising the USA as the imperial centre 
even though at the moment they cannot defy its economic 
and military supremacy. (…) From all of this one can con-
clude: the era of imperialism is not over.»38 However, it would 
be fatal not to recognise that the virulence of imperialism is 
not limited to the USA. In almost every region – be it the EU 
and Russia in Europe, China or India in Asia, Iran or Israel in 
the Middle East – powers strive for regional hegemony. Fail-
ure to acknowledge this, instead merely charging the USA 
with imperialism, could rightly give rise to the suspicion of 
undue anti-Americanism.
Since 1945, there have been well over 150 wars in the world. 
The USA, Great Britain and France have been either directly 
or indirectly involved in most of these with their own troops or 
arsenal. Only Germany cannot be accused of using its military 
means for the enforcement of national interests. Twice in its 
35 Arno Klönne: «Empire und Empirie. Zum Diskurs über US-amerikanische Globalpolitik», 
in Rainer Butenschön und Eckart Spoo (eds.): Töten – Plündern – Herrschen. Wege zu 
neuen Kriegen, Hamburg: VSA Verlag, 2003, p. 126–130; p. 129. 36 Cf. «Real existierende 
Strukturen internationaler politischer Regulierung», in: Ulrich Brand et al.: Global Govern-
ance, Münster: Westphälisches Dampfboot, 2000, p. 89–128. 37 Cf. Chossudovsky: 
Global Brutal. Der entfesselte Welthandel, die Armut, der Krieg, Frankfurt and Main: Zwei-
tausendeins, 2002. 38 Klönne: «Empire und Empirie. Zum Diskurs über US-amerikanische 
Globalpolitik», in Rainer Butenschön und Eckart Spoo (eds.): Töten – Plündern – Herrschen. 
Wege zu neuen Kriegen, Hamburg: VSA Verlag, 2003, p. 126–130; p. 33f.
7attempts to grab world power, Germany inflicted terrible wars 
on the world and was responsible for Auschwitz. As a result, 
Germany was deprived of its sovereignty by the allied forces 
and liberating powers. In the international power play, the 
West German state on account of its restricted sovereignty 
over a period of 50 years had a «location disadvantage». «Ger-
many had to accept the role of a junior partner, not to mention 
the GDR which had subordinated itself to the Soviet Union.»
the normalIsatIon of germany
Germany was permitted only very tentative steps towards 
its own foreign policy within a strict regulatory framework.39 
In the process of normalising German foreign policy, first 
the Ius ad Bellum had to be created again.40 Ius ad Bellum 
is considered to be the most important external criterion of 
state sovereignty on the basis of the imperialist world order 
of 1914 and within the logic of capital accumulation, which 
the conservatives were the first to take up after the Second 
World War.
The normalisation of the unified German states’ foreign policy 
was directed primarily at the Ius ad Bellum, whose reform 
was not merely a problem of the past and of bilateral dip-
lomatic relations, but was also a structural problem related 
to German armed forces. According to the German military 
and the makers of German foreign policy, these armed forc-
es were certainly capable of defence but not of war; after 
1989/90 the German armed forces were not considered to 
be capable of forming any alliances in a context where NATO 
had «emancipated» itself from its obligation of defence. As 
a result, normalisation in the sphere of foreign policy meant 
developing the capacity to deploy German armed forces in 
wars («war capability») as well as developing an equally sig-
nificant «alliance-capability».
However, any integration into collective security or defence 
systems (UNO, NATO etc.), in which the right to wage war is 
restricted or even denied to member states, had to be inter-
preted by the conservatives as an unreasonable restriction 
of state sovereignty. For Germany, it also meant that through 
the integration into collective security systems with the re-
sulting obligations placed on Germany due to its alliances, a 
strict refusal of the Ius ad Bellum could only be partly circum-
vented.41 After the allied forces granted Germany restricted 
sovereignty, the conservatives were compelled to interpret 
this as «chained sovereignty»; particularly as Germany was 
incomplete, only encompassing half of the territory of the 
previous German Reich.42 Initially, the establishment of the 
Ius ad Bellum for the entire German state was an important 
issue for conservative elites, yet always had to come to terms 
with NATO and, following German reunification, increasingly 
also with the creation of a common European Defence and 
Security Policy within the framework of EU integration. After 
the Second World War, it was not only Germany that lost its 
sovereignty, the whole of Europe did: the old powers had 
lost their independence. The spheres of influence shifted in 
favour of the new superpowers USA and USSR; the British 
Empire was dissolved, leading to bloc formations, confron-
tation and the Cold War. At the beginning of the 1990s, the 
spheres of influence began to be reorganised. The USSR lost 
out on account of its abrupt dissolution and in the process of 
EU integration the USA successively lost its hegemony over 
East and West Europe.
state sovereIgnty
State sovereignty in the traditional sense follows Carl Sch-
mitt’s definition, according to which sovereign is the one 
who can command the state of exception within a country 
and abroad.43 The two important potentials of the sovereign 
state with the power to command the exception are an «in-
dependence» to do so as well as the «ability» to do so.44 This 
aspect of sovereignty functions as a traditional standard of 
what constitutes the normal. However, it is subject to a dy-
namic that moves in in both directions and thus cancels itself 
out: within the country, state sovereignty according to the 
«western standard» becomes the inalienable property of the 
people (people’s sovereignty), even though exercising this 
sovereignty is delegated to state institutions and the ruling 
elite gathered there. Michael Jäger writes: even though in 
these western societies the state stands above society, the 
state derives from an abstraction. This abstraction implies 
that the people themselves took over the state in order to 
divide into instances of the state and of society, to which the 
mediations of parliamentarianism testify; this take-over of the 
state occurred through certain incidents and in the struggle 
to obtain specific goals. The definitiveness of these events 
and the associated aims fed this abstraction of the state and 
impacted upon its concretisation.»45
State sovereignty is less democratised externally than within 
a country. Whenever one speaks of a «raison d’etat», the spe-
cific content of state policy is more or less withdrawn from 
democratic control. Foreign policy is not merely the summa-
tion of individual decisions and actions – there is a principle 
behind it. Foreign policy is the result of an overall strategy 
that does not always – in fact very rarely – exists entirely in the 
open. The overall strategy is hardly ever laid down democrati-
cally but is determined by the governing elite. This tradition 
harks back to an era of monarchic power and continues right 
up to the present. Ruling elites view public opinion as either 
an obstacle or an exploitable factor. Ruling elites like to draw 
on public opinion to legitimise foreign policy decisions. In re-
ality, public opinion has very little influence on foreign policy. 
There is no more than the suggestion of the possibility of a 
democratic decision-making process. If public opinion and 
foreign policy correspond, public opinion is instrumentalised 
for the purposes of legitimation. In the case where there is a 
divergence, public opinion becomes the object of propagan-
39 Stuby: Die «gefesselte» Souveränität der Bundesrepublik. Zur Entwicklung der BRD 
im Rahmen der US Globalstrategie, Heilbronn: Distel Literatur Verlag, 1987, p. 11. 40 Else-
where, I provide a comprehensive analysis of this process of normalisation, See Marcus 
Hawel: Die normalisierte Nation. Vergangenheitsbewältigung und Aussenpolitik in Deut-
schland, foreword by Moshe Zuckermann, Hannover: Offizin Verlag, 2007. 41 See Dieter 
S. Lutz: «Das Grundgesetz fordert Friedenspolitik. Zum Streit um unsere sicherheitspoli-
tische Zukunft,» in Dieter S. Lutz (ed.): Deutsche Soldaten weltweit? Blauhelme, Ein-
greiftruppen, «out of area» – Der Stret um unsere sicherheitspolitische Zukunft, Reinbek 
bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1993, p. 43. 42 Cf. Stuby: Die «gefesselte» Souveränität der Bun-
desrepublik. Zur Entwicklung der BRD im Rahmen der US Globalstrategie, Heilbronn: 
Distel Literatur Verlag, 1987, p. 10. 43 Cf. Carl Schmitt: Politische Theology – Four Chap-
ters on the Concept of Sovereignty, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006, 
p. 11. 44 Stuby: Die «gefesselte» Souveränität der Bundesrepublik. Zur Entwicklung der 
BRD im Rahmen der US Globalstrategie, Heilbronn: Distel Literatur Verlag, 1987, p. 10. 
With reference to Hermann Jahrreiss, we can make a critical comparison of the historical 
development of the concept of sovereignty: Die Souveränität der Staaten. Ein Wort – 
mehrere Begriffe – viele Missverständnisse.» In Hanns Hermann (eds.): Die Entstehung 
des modernen souveränen Staates, Cologne/Berlin (West): Kiepenheuer & Wietsch, 1967, 
p. 35 ff. – Jahrreiss endorses the imperialist tradition. «We cannot expect anything differ-
ent from a proponent of international law who was an expert witness for the defence in 
the Nuremberg Trials and who doubted the binding force of prohibitions of aggression.  – 
Cf. Stuby: Die «gefesselte» Souveränität der Bundesrepublik. Zur Entwicklung der BRD 
im Rahmen der US Globalstrategie, Heilbronn: Distel Literatur Verlag, 1987, 
p. 76. 45 Michäl Jäger: Probleme und Perspektiven der Berliner Republik, Münster: West-
fälisches Dampfboot, 1999, p. 76.
8dist campaigns that seek to wed public opinion to the direc-
tions of foreign policy. In other instances, public opinion in 
other states is used for the purposes of legitimation in order 
to exert pressure on one’s own public. It would therefore be 
a reasonable demand to subject foreign policy decisions to 
democratic control influence.
restrIcted sovereIgnty
With regard to foreign policy, the sovereignty of the state 
is being increasingly abolished through inter-state institu-
tions. Modern international law restricts the foreign policy of 
states and subjects it to certain rules. However, adherence 
to these rules depends on whether states generally accept 
the voluntary codes of conduct. This is because there is still 
no developed supranational authority that could effectively 
impose sanctions in cases of non-compliance. Nevertheless, 
there are attempts to form a supranational authority, a form 
of civilisational progress that retracts from Schmitt’s dictum. 
The Geneva Conventions emerged from the idea of domes-
ticating wars through international law. After the First World 
War (in 1920), there was an attempt to use the League of 
Nations to impose sanctions on countries that waged wars 
in breach of codes of justice. For the first time with the Bri-
and Kellog Pact (1928), wars of aggression were explicitly 
outlawed and a restriction imposed on sovereign states with 
regard to an absolute Ius ad Bellum. The UN-Charter permits 
state violence against other states (members of the UN) only 
when it can be considered a case of defence against armed 
aggression.46 Relatively speaking, states are no longer ab-
solutely sovereign with respect to foreign policy. The legal 
regulation of inter-state violence in modern international law 
is three-fold; one differentiates between Ius ad Bellum (the 
right to war), the Ius in Bello (right in war) and the Ius Armo-
rum (right to armament).47 In the «right to war», yardsticks 
of justice are laid down. Only «just» wars can be waged. 
«Unjust wars» are outlawed.48 The «right in war» is meant to 
regulate the use of weapons in order to achieve «justice» in 
war, for example through «humane» treatment of victims and 
prisoners of war.49 At least in the «international law of war», 
there is an advanced understanding that all those affected 
by war are victims. However, it is difficult to track down the 
aggressor and the guilty, because under the moral primate of 
renouncing violence, aggressors designate their aggression 
as defence, meaning that only «defence wars» are waged 
from both sides (pre-emptive strike). The «right to armament» 
regulates the possession of weapons (for example, the Nucle-
ar Non-Proliferation Treaty 1968, B-Arms-Convention 1972, 
C-Weapons-Convention 1993). At least the means, i. e. the 
precondition for war, can be partly restricted through the in-
fluence on state armament programmes, even if the struc-
tural reasons for war are not eliminated. Confidence-building 
measures such as arms control, non-proliferation treaties, 
transparency of industries etc. can at least contribute towards 
preventing a dangerous arms race, or could even bring about 
mutual disarmament. 
All these more or less obligatory restrictions ensured by in-
ternational law demonstrate that traditional imperialism can 
never again become an effective force (in spite of the tem-
porary tendency to ignore international law). This is because 
networked interdependence within world order has changed 
significantly. The imperialist mechanisms are compelled to 
transformation through the standards of modern interna-
tional law, the norms of «global governance», the existence 
of supranational institutions (UNO, IMF, World Bank, NATO 
etc.), and last but not the least on account of a higher de-
pendence of states on one another, not only during crisis 
phases of global capital but also in the transnationalisation 
of originally national capital. However, transformation does 
not mean disappearance. These mechanisms remain effec-
tive precisely because they are superseded in the processes 
of transformation.
Wherever something is superseded in the dialectical sense 
of the word, a new term has to emerge. Imperialism has not 
been the last stage of capitalism. Rather, imperialism (like 
capitalism) passes through different phases. Each of these 
phases is dependent on the dynamics of structural change 
within capitalism itself. Therefore, if we shelve the term, we 
dispense with a relevant way of understanding of the world 
we live in. Accordingly, the reverse of the aforementioned 
dictum also applies: those who do not want to criticise impe-
rialism should remain silent about capitalism. 
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46 Cf. Charter of the United Nations, Art. 51, archived at: http://www.un.org/en/docu-
ments/charter/chapter7.shtml. 47 Cf. Stefan Brunner: Deutsche Soldaten im Ausland. 
Fotsetzung der Aussenpolitik mit militärischen Mitteln? Munich: C. H. Beck Verlag, 1993, 
p. 119–128. 48 «The differentiation between just and unjust wars had to fail because 
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Ibid., p. 119. 49 Cf. Ibid., p. 120.
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